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For the Enrichment of Jewish Thought 
The title of the volume is an adaptation 
ofFriarRaymond Martin'sPugioFidei, the 
influential manual for the Christian mission 
to the Jews and the crowning achievement of 
his monumental study CapistrumJudeorum 
completed in 1267. The Christian mission­
izing efforts among 13th century European 
Jews has been the subject of studies by 
Yitzhak Baer, Salo Baron, Solomon Gray­
zel, Amos Funkenstein, Hyman Maccoby, 
David Berger, William Herskowitz and 
Jeremy Cohen among others in recent years. 
Chazan 's volume, in addition to serving as a 
useful review of the innovative Christian 
missionizing efforts and Jewish responses 
from 1240 to 1280 argues against the opin­
ion of Jeremy Cohen (in his The Friars and 
the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti­
] udaism [Ithaca, 1982]) that "the Dominicans 
and Franciscans . . .  sought to implement a 
new Christian ideology with regard to the 
Jews, one that allotted the Jews no legitimate 
rights to exist in European society." (Chazan, 
p. 2) 
In opposing Cohen's thesis, Chazan 
argues there is no evidence that the "legiti­
mate rights" of the Jews were curtailed and 
cites (p. 176) the Church's formulation with 
regard to the Jews in its Constitutio pro Ju­
deis: "Just as the Jews ought not enjoy 
license to presume to do in their synagogues 
more than permitted by law, so too in those 
(privileges) conceded to them they should 
not suffer curtailment." Chazan 's argument 
here is beside the point. Cohen is making a 
case that the Friars attempted to advance a 
program that would deprive Jews of their 
rights, not that they succeeded. And with 
some exceptions, such as the occurrences in 
Valreas, Troyes, Aragon and Navarre in 
1247, 1288, 1305 and 1328 respectively, 
and other "sporadic incidents" (Cohen, p. 
44), they didn't succeed in overturning the 
canonical regulations that tolerated the 
Jewish presence in Christian Europe. 
Influential as they were, the Domini­
cans and Franciscans in the 13th century had 
to contend with the often divergent consid­
erations of both Church and State with regard 
to the Jews. Witness the position of King 
James of Aragon in 1263 who, after per­
mitting the Dominicans to compel Jewish 
attendance at their sermons, reversed himself 
by limiting the circumstances and locations 
in which such sermons could take place. 
James also forbade the friars to take Chris­
tian laymen with them "for fear that they 
might be incited to riot" (Cohen, p. 84). 
Such warnings to the friars were repeated by 
James' successors in Aragon, Peter III and 
James II. Peter IV of Aragon even censured 
Dominicans and Franciscans for inflamma­
tory sermons that led to the murder of Jews 
and the confiscation of their property. Philip 
IV notified his bailiffs not to aid the friars in 
an unlawful manner and even had copies 
distributed ofPope Gregory X' s edition (from 
1274) of the encyclical Turbato cor de, which, 
whileallowinginquisitorialjurisdictionover 
relapsed Jewish converts to Christianity, 
restricted access to the Jews who hadn't 
converted. Yitzhak Baer' s comment (in his 
A History of the Jews in Christian Spain 
[Philadelphia,l961], vol.l, p. 178) remains 
valid: "During this period (13th century 
Aragon at the end of the Reconquest) the 
right of the Jews to their own existence was 
still recognized. Even after the close of the 
Reconquest the state still needed the Jews 
for the large revenues it derived from them 
in a variety of ways." 
Chazan 's volume is based in large part 
on his earlier studies of Christian missionary 
efforts in the 13th century and Jewish re­
sponses thereto(Chazan, pp. 212-213). The 
opening chapters of his volume deal with the 
pre-13th century Christian mission, which it 
is claimed "shows almost no evidence of 
serious proselytizing among the Jews" (p. 
21) and fails to address issues of contem­
porary Jewish life even as it relies, for the 
most part, on the time-worn and uncon­
vincing "proof texts" from Scripture. Har­
bingers of what was to come in the 13th 
century are already seen in the writings of 
Peter the Venable, abbot of Cluny (1092-
1 156) who emphasizes "the nullity of Juda-
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ism and the debased state of its adherents 
combined with the . . .  prospect of converting 
these obstinate and unfortunate beings to a 
vision of the truth" (p. 23). Peter prefigures 
the revised Christian mission in the centory 
following his death when the friars make a 
sustained effort to learn Judaic texts in the 
Hebrew original and gain a respectable fa­
miliarity with the Talmud. Chazan correctly 
points out that the Christian mission to the 
Jews needs to be seen in the wider context of 
the Church's agenda in the 13th century. 
Unified, powerful and confident, the Church, 
in this centory, while enjoying unparalleled 
prestige and influence is at the same time 
beset with intramural discord and domestic 
heresies, notto mention the ever present threat 
from a belligerent Muslim force determined 
to wage its righteous struggle (jihad) and 
spread the rule oflslamic law. To combat the 
danger from the latter, the friars, led by 
Raymond of Penaforte (d. 1275), labored to 
gain a knowledge of Arabic and an acquain­
tance with Islamic Iiteratore to proselytize 
among the Muslims. From their efforts to 
gain converts among the Muslims, the atten­
tion of the friars turned to the Jews living 
among them. Chazan offers the following 
reasons why the Church couldn't overlook 
the Jews in its missionary efforts, although 
the latter didn't present nearly as much of a 
threat as the more powerful Muslim forces: 
"To overlook the Jews would be to court 
danger. In a society committed to enhanced 
clarification of the demands of Christian living 
and to more exacting fulfillment of these 
demands, the issueof theJewsresident within 
Christiandom, while not a priority of the 
highest order, had to be addressed. Beyond 
this, there was the ongoing sense that the Jews 
represented a muted, continuous reproach to 
Christians. Given thecombinationofcertainty 
and insecurity ... therewasrenewedsensitivity 
to the age-old question of how those people 
most directly conversant with God's initial 
revelation could fail to read its implications 
correctly . . .  Finally, there is an element of the 
irrational as well . . . Irrational suggestions 
about Jewish malevolence and power had 
already begun to circulate in the 12th century. 
During the 13th centory, these stereotypes 
proliferated, raising wholly unrealistic fears 
of potential harm that might flow from the 
Jews" (p. 30). 
Tothislistshould beaddedthe emerging 
perception of the Jews as having been cor­
rupted by the teachings of the Talmud, which 
Pope Gregory IX condemned (in 1239) as 
"the chief cause that holds the Jews obstinate 
in their perfidy." In this new perception a 
distinction is made between the "biblical'' 
Jews whom Augustine wished to tolerate and 
the contemporary rabbinic Jew who has 
misinterpreted the authentic scriptural refer­
ence (Cohen, pp. 242-243). The fears of 
potential harm flowing from the Jews is for' 
malized in the bull Sicut Iudeis issued by 
Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), which limits 
the rights of Jews in Christiandom to those 
"who have not presumed to plot against the 
Christian faith." 
A "new style" (Chazan, p. 38) Chris­
tian missionary effort to the Jews occurs in 
1242, the year of the public burning of the 
Talmud in Paris. A royal edict from King 
James I of Aragon led to what was to 
become the established practice of forcing 
Jews (and Muslims) to listen to the sermons 
of the friars bringing "the good news" of 
the Christian message. Jewish reaction to 
being forced to attend conversionist ser­
mons is reflected in the polemical work 
Mil hemet Misvah by Meir ben Samuel of 
Narbonne in which the latter argues that 
forcing Jews to listen to Christian ser­
monizing is "a flagrant violation of the 
basic safeguards historically assured by 
Christiandom" to its Jewish minority 
To combat the danger from the 
Muslim force, the friars ... la­
bored to gain knowledge of 
Arabic and an acquaintance with 
Islamic literature to proselytize 
among the Muslims. 
(Chazan, p. 43). And that among these 
safeguards is the assumption that Christian 
rulers have guaranteed the Jews the right to 
practice their religious traditions as they 
understand them. The key passage in the 
Milhemet Misvah, quoted by Chazan (p. 
41) is given in the Jewish rebuttal to the 
Christian argument "Indeed you are com­
manded to protect us and to preserve us in 
your midst by guarding our religion ac­
cording to our faith, so that you not cause 
us to transgress one of the commandments 
of the Torah, according to our under­
standing of its meaning (italics mine)." The 
latter is a most significant and far-reaching 
understanding of the rights of the Jewish 
minority in Christian Europe and it is re­
grettable that there is no trace of it in 
contemporary Christian sources. 
From Meir b. Samuel's Milhemet 
Misvah there is evidence the friars were 
using rabbinic sources in their missioniz­
ing efforts. Following are two examples 
(quoted by Chazan, p. 69): The priest 
asked: "Why do you not place purple 
thread on your fringes, as it is written in 
your Torah: 'Let them attach a chord of 
blue to the fringe at each comer (Num. 
15:38)?"' The priest asked: It is written in 
your Torah: 'From the day after the sab­
bath . . . you must count 50 days (Lev. 
23: 15-16) .' Why do you go to great lengths 
to explain this verse and to remove it seem­
ingly from its simple meaning, saying that 
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there are only 49 days and that the 50th day 
is not included in the reckoning." These 
arguments show not only a familiarity with 
rabbinic teaching but reflect the argumenta­
tion of the Karaites in their polemics with 
Rabbanites. The degree, if any, to which the 
friars made use of Karaite polemics isn't 
mentioned in Chazan 's study, although there 
is an opinion that Nicholas Donin, the Jew­
ish convert to Christianity in his charges 
against the Talmud, may have used Karaite 
materials (Cohen, pp. 61-62). 
Chazan makes much of the "new line 
of (Christian) missionizing argumentation . 
.. advanced first in the 1240s and 1250s." (p. 
68). In this "new" argumentation the friars 
bring a know ledge of rabbinic sources in 
advancing their missionizing efforts. In 
support of this thesis, Chazan cites the mid-
13th-century Commentary on the Aggadot 
oftheTalmudby Isaac ben Yedaiah in which 
the following exchange (quoted by Chazan, 
pp. 69-70) takes place between the Rabbi 
and one of the Christian sages: "(He asked 
me) and disputed with me as to why we 
remain obstinate concerning the King Mes­
siah, who came, in their view, to lead the new 
faith that had been initiated for them. They 
argue strenuously through their (the rabbi's) 
words and all similar statements that they 
(the rabbis), of blessed memory, foresaw 
their faith and gave testimony that the 
Messiah had come (italics mine) and that he 
led them in the city ofRome. (The Christian 
sage then asked:) . . . what else their (the 
rabbis') intention was and what else they 
proposed to teach us when they said, con­
cerning the Messiah, that he created in their 
days and went to Rome." 
The rabbinic statement referred to by 
the Christian sage is from Bavli Sanhedrin 
98a: "R. Joshua b. Levi met Elijah ...  (and) 
asked him: 'When will the Messiah come?' 
-'Go and ask him himself,' was his reply. 
'Where is he sitting?'- 'At the entrance of 
the city of Rome."' However, it is far from 
certain this use of the said legend in Bavli 
Sanhedrin for missionizing purposes was 
"advanced first" in the 1240s and 1250s. It 
is like! y Rashi (died in 1105, in Troyes) 
already was aware that a legend proclaiming 
the Messiah's arrival in Rome could be used 
to advance the Christian missionizing argu­
ment, and may have been employed for just 
this purpose in Rashi' s own day. Otherwise, 
why would he go out of his way to interpret 
this legend allegorically (in his commentary 
to Bavli Sanhedrin 98a: "At the entrance of 
the city,") as follows: "(The Messiah was 
not sitting in person) at the entrance of the 
city, but was stationed in the Garden of Eden 
and in the part of the Garden which faces the 
gate of the city." 
From the writings of Abraham Ibn 
Ezra (died 1167), who traveled widely in 
Christian Europe, there is reference to the 
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debate on the question of whether the Mes­
siah already had come. In Ibn Ezra's com­
mentary to Isaiah 52:13 he writes: "'My 
servant shall prosper,' - those who debate 
with us (i.e. the Christians) say that this 
refers to their God (i.e. Jesus of Nazareth) . .  
.andthere aremanywho interpret(thephrase 
'my servant') as a reference to the Messiah, 
because of the statement by the Sage,s (in 
Lamentations Rabbah 1.51 and in Pesiqta 
3 7) that on the day that the temple was 
destroyed the Messiah was born and he was 
bound in chains, but there is no substance to 
these citations." The "many who interpret" 
is probably a reference to Christians who are 
familiar with rabbinic sources and use them 
for their polemical purposes well before the 
1240s and 1250s. The question of whether 
the Messiah already had come also figures 
prominently in Ibn Ezra's geulah, ''I'm oivai 
yomru ra li" (possibly composed for Rosh 
Hashanah) in which he writes: "When my 
enemies speak evilly of me and I think that 
my foot has given way -, the God of Abra­
ham is my strength and the Fear of Isaac is 
with me .. . Would that! could associate with 
Daniel, the precious man ... I would ask him 
when the redemption will come and ascertain 
if it had already occurred or if the prophecies 
are yet to be fulfilled" (Cf. The Religious 
Poems of Abraham Ibn Ezra, ed. I. Levin 
[Jerusalem, 1980], vol. 2, pp. 25-26,lines 1-
2, 13, 15-16). Reflected in this liturgical 
work of Ibn Ezra's is a debate with his 
enemies (i.e. the Christians) who argue the 
Messiah already had come, as Israel Levin 
correctly points out in his commentary to the 
poem: "If it had already passed: '- If, 
according to my enemies, the promised time 
for my redemption has passed because the 
prophecies have been fulfilled during the 
time of the Second Temple and are not des­
tined to be realized again." 
Chazan elaborates on the "new mis­
sionizing argumentation" and "the serious 
challenge" (p. 86) it presented and focuses 
on the Barcelona disputation of 1263 and its 
leading figures Friar Paul Christian and Rab­
bi Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides). In the 
course of the debate Friar Paul, in support of 
his position that the Messiah already had 
come, cites the rabbinic account telling of 
the birth of the Messiah at the time of the 
destruction of the Temple (mentioned above). 
To this Nahmanides replies: "Behold it says 
that, on the day of the destruction, after the 
Temple was destroyed, on that very day the 
Messiah was born. Thus, Jesus isn't the 
Messiah as you say, for he was born and 
killed prior to the destruction of the Second 
Temple. Indeed his birth was in fact approx­
imately 200 years prior to the destruction of 
the Temple (according to Jewish reckoning 
in Abraham Ibn Daud, Sefer Ha-Qabbalah, 
ed. G.D. Cohen [Philadelphia, 1967], 15-16 
[Hebrew text] and 20-21 [English transla-
lion]), and even according to your reckon­
ing it was 73 years earlier." (Cf. Moses ben 
Nahman, Kitvei Rabbenu Moshe ben Nah­
man,ed. Ch. Chavel [Jerusalem, 1971], vol. 
1, 306). 
To this argument of Nahmanides one 
of the friars replied: "The debate does not 
now concern Jesus. The question is only if 
the Messiah has come or not. You say that 
he has not come and this book of yours says 
that he has come," (cf. Kitvei, vol. 1, 306, 
and Chazan, p. 94). When further pressed 
on the question of whether the Messiah had 
come as related in the rabbinic legend (ag­
gadah) Rabbi Moses replied: "I do not 
believe in this rabbinic legend,'' ( cf. K itvei, 
From the writings of Abraham Ibn 
Ezra (died 1167), who traveled 
widely in Christian Europe, there 
is a reference to the debate on the 
question of whether the Messiah 
already had come. 
vol. 1, 306). In describing this exchange, 
Chazan observes (on page 96): "It must be 
remembered that ultimately both Friar Paul 
and Nahmanides were addressing a Jewish 
audience, an audience for which a broad 
disavowal of rabbinic aggadot would be­
as it was for Nahmanides himself- diffi­
cult to accept." Chazan's statement here is 
troubling. Why would a Jewish audience 
fmd it difficult to accept a disavowal of 
rabbinic legends given there is ample sup­
port for the position of Nahmanides on this 
issue from the opinion of R. Zeira in the 
name of Samuel (in Yerushalmi Peah, 2.6): 
"One does not deduce facts from rabbinic 
legends,"- a view shared by Rav Hai Gaon 
and by Rav Sherirah Gaon (cf. Osar Ha­
Geonim, ed. B.M. Levin [Haifa-Jerusalem, 
1928-1943], Hagigah, #67-#68). 
It is also unclear from Chazan's ac­
count why Nahmanides himself found it 
"difficult to accept" a disavowal of aggadot. 
For an opinion on tltis question it is neces­
sary to consultJeremy Cohen's study where 
Nahmanides dilemma is considered in the 
context of his known views on rabbinic 
legends. Following is Cohen's observation 
(p.ll9): "Nahmanides distinction between 
Talmudic law, binding upon all orthodox 
Jews, on the one hand, and midrash, which 
any Jew could freely reject, on the other, 
appears to diverge sharply from his other­
wise essentially anti-rationalist outlook. 
Throughout his biblical commentaries and 
mystical writings, Nahmanides commonly 
assumed and asserted the basic truth of the 
aggadah, in order to justify his typological 
understanding of history and kabbalistic 
theology. Moreover, he insisted that agga-
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dot,like scripture, never be interpreted com­
pletely allegorically, so as to detach their 
symbolic interpretation from their literal 
meaning in obvious preference for the 
former." 
Chazan correctly observes that the 
missionary efforts of Friar Raymond Mar­
tin, successor to Friar Paul Christian, is more 
careful and sophisticated than the Iauer's. 
However, Chazan is unconvincing on how 
serious a threat Friar Raymond posed to the 
Jewish community. Saul Liebermann ob­
served that, although it isn't likely Friar 
Raymond forged the rabbinic texts in his 
anthology, his "incorrect reading of those 
texts betray a characteristic not commonly 
found among Jews who are familiar with 
rabbinic literature," and gives several exam­
ples in support of this view. (Cf. S. Lieber­
marm,Shqiin [Jerusalem,1970], p.45). How 
serious a threat Friar Raymond was to the 
Jews depends on whether one agrees (as 
does Chazan, following Jeremy Cohen and 
Yitzhak) that the polemical dialogue between 
Jew and Christian from the pen of Rabbi 
Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Adret (Rashba) 
(ca. 1235-1310) of Barcelona (cf. J. Perles, 
R. SalomiJ b. Abraham b. Adreth: Sein 
Leben and seine Shriften [Breslau, 1863] 
Heb. p. 24-56) is directed against the argu­
mentation of Friar Raymond. Given there 
are only "occasional similarities in subject 
matter between the Pugio Fidei and Adret's 
polemical tract" (Cohen, pp. 156-157) it is 
far from certain the Christian protagonist in 
Ibn Adret's dialogue reflects the views of 
Raymond Martin. 
In support of his position, Chazan 
notes that Friar Raymond employs both 
aggadic and halakhic materials in support of 
his missionary efforts, much like the Christian 
protagonist in Ibn Adret's polemical tract 
who argues as follows: "Some of the com­
mandments they explain literally, but they 
claim that they are not of intrinsic sigrtificance 
and are only forms intended to hint at future 
events. When the future event is realized, 
the commandments which prefigured it are 
annulled. One of the commandments which 
they include in this category is the com­
mandment of the paschal sacrifice, which is 
a memento intended to hint at what they 
claim later took place. Some of them bring 
proof from what is said in TractateQiddushin, 
in the chapter Ha-Ish Meqadesh: ' And all 
the aggregate community of the Israelites 
shall slaughter it (Exodus 12:6). This teaches 
that all Israel fulfills the obligation with one 
paschal offering (Bavli, Qiddushin 42a).' 
With what paschal offering will all Israel 
fulfill its obligation? Surely that special 
paschal offering." ( cf. Perles, p. 31 and 
Chazan, pp. 14 7 -148). However, given Friar 
Raymond's extensive corpus of rabbinic 
sources one would expect to find this hala­
khic reference among its numerous cita-
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lions, but one doesn't. Chazan is correct in 
observing the Christian protagonist in Ibn 
Adret's tract possessed an "excellent com­
mandof difficulthalakhicmaterial"(Chazan, 
p. 151), but it doesn't follow that this pro­
tagonist is to be identified with Friar Ray­
mond who, asS. Liebermann observed (cited 
above), was flawed in his understanding of 
rabbinic texts. 
The 13th century Christian mission­
izing effort and the Jewish response is a 
fascinating and complex subject. Robert 
Chazan deserves our thanks for enlarging 
our understanding of the argumentations 
and rebuttals. The definitive work on the 
issues, however, remains to be written. 
Leon J. Weinberger is research professor 
of religious studies at the University of 
Alabama in Tuscaloosa and contributing 
editor of Menorah Review. 
Sidney Hook, philosopher and prolific 
writer, died in 1989 at the age of 86. During 
his lifetime he published more than 20 an­
thologies, 30 books and 500 articles. He 
wrote on a wide range of topics, but his main 
(overlapping) focuses were (!) Marxism, 
democracy, freedom and equality; (2) aca­
demic freedom and integrity; and (3) the 
philosophy of John Dewey and pragmatism. 
Convictions is a collection of 29 pre­
viously published essays that represent 
Hook's most deeply held views. All but 
three of the essays were ftrst published in the 
1970sand 1980s (and mostly the latter). The 
three exceptions are 'The Ethics of Suicide" 
(1972), "Reflections on the Jewish Question" 
(1949) and "The Faiths of Whittaker 
Chambers" (1952, a review of a book by 
Chambers on the communist movement in 
America). There are opening and closing 
essays,one onJewishnessand anti-semitism, 
three articles on death (provision of expen­
sive medical treatment for the elderly, eu­
thanasia and suicide), eight on politics (de· 
mocracy, equality, freedom and commu­
nism) and 15 on university education (the 
curriculum and academic freedom). 
Sidney Hook wasn't afraid to go 
against the current He was Jewish by birth, 
but- from age 13- atheist by conviction. 
When a communist, he was critical of the 
totalitarianism of Leninism. When an anti· 
communist, he was openly critical of Sena· 
tor McCarthy's demagoguery (e.g., in a 1953 
letter to the New York Times). And, in the 
last I 0 years of his life he argued against the 
growing acceptance at universities of pref­
erential hiring and admission practices, re­
strictions on freedom of expression to deal 
with problems of racial and sexual harass­
ment, and changes in the curriculum con­
cerning race, gender and class issues. 
It is to the last set of arguments that I 
now tum. Or rather, it is to the arguments as 
they appear in Convictions that I now tum. 
Hook has written widely on these issues, so 
I shall only be considering a subset of the 
arguments he has offered. My goal isn't to 
refute his arguments for his position, but 
rather to identify some of the issues that 
deserve more consideration than he gives 
them in Convictions. Because of space 
limitations, I shall not consider his opposi· 
lion to strong forms of affirmative action. 
In response to recent problems of 
verbal racial, sexual and ethnic harassment 
many universities have adopted harassment 
policies restricting freedom of speech. Hook 
frrmly opposed such policies. We can agree 
with Hook that such policies shouldn'trestrict 
the expression of a view- no matter what 
its content-if it is expressed in a minimally 
intimidating manner in a context of rational 
inquiry. Some views- such as that African 
Americans are less intelligent than white 
Americans- may be intimidating in virtue 
of their content, but in a context of rational 
inquiry that isn't a good reason for restrict­
ing their expression. True views may be 
intimidating. At a university we should be 
constantly challenging views so as to achieve 
truth. In a forum of rational discussion 
restrictions based on content are, therefore, 
inappropriate. 
If restrictions are appropriate, they 
must be based on the manner or context in 
which views are expressed- not the con­
tent of the views. A given view can be 
expressed in a variety of ways, and it may be 
appropriate to restrict its expression in 
needlessly intimidating manners (such as 
"nigger" or "faggot" instead of "blacks" or 
"African American," or "homosexual" or 
"gay''). Likewise, restrictions on the content 
of speech when such speech isn't part of a 
context of rational discussion (as in a taunt 
from the street of"Nice legs!" or "Women 
aren't as smart as men!") also may be justi­
fiable. Because the university is a center of 
critical inquiry, it must foster an atmosphere 
in which intimidation is minimized. For that 
reason, some restrictions on verbal harass-
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ment- if they help promote an atmosphere 
in which all feel free to critically examine 
ideas (and of course they may not!)- may 
well be justified. Hook, however, doesn't 
discuss these intricacies in the book. 
Withrespecttothe disruptionofclasses 
or talks, I agree entirely with Hook that it is 
wrong. If one fmds the view expressed in the 
class or talk abhorrent, one can fmd a forum, 
perhaps a demonstration, in which to criti­
cize the view. Physical harassmentshouldn't 
be used to put down a view. 
What about campaigning against in­
viting, or in favor of canceling an invitation 
to, controversial speakers (such as Jeane 
Kirkpatrick or Henry Kissinger)? Hook 
thought such campaigns were wrong on the 
grounds that all views must be heard. There 
seems, however, to be at least three distinct 
sorts of cases. One is where it is simply the 
view that is controversial, and not the 
speaker's past acts or manner of presentation. 
Here we can agree with Hook that it is wrong 
to campaign against an invitation. For if it is 
only the view that is problematic, a campaign 
against the invitation is a campaign against 
the opportunity to examine critically an idea. 
And thatisn't appropriate at a university. Of 
course, publicly criticizing the views -
perhaps while the person is on campus- is 
another matter, and is entirely justifiable. 
A second sort of case is where the 
person typically speaks in a significantly 
intimidating manner (e.g., with lots of slurs 
against Jews, women or blacks). Here a 
campaign against the invitation may be en­
tirely appropriate, and the rationale is the 
same as the rationale for a harassment policy 
restricting needlessly intimidating speech 
on campus. Needlessly intimidating speech 
interferes with the university's mission of 
critical inquiry. 
A third sort of case is where the person 
has engaged in gross! y immoral acts (such as 
systematic violence against Jews, women or 
blacks). Here too a campaign against an 
invitation is entirely appropriate. For an 
invitation bestows at least some honor from 
the university on the person, and the mem­
bers of the university may not wish to do 
this. Of course, the group issuing the in vi· 
tation shouldn't simply give in to group 
pressure. They have a right to invite anyone 
they want to campus to speak (as long as it 
isn't needlessly intimidating) and the uni­
versity should recognize and protect that 
right. Butthat is no reasonforthose opposed 
not to voice their opposition. 
The second big issue Hook addressed 
over the years is academic integrity as it 
concerns how professors teach their courses 
and the content of general education cur­
riculum requirements. Hood was vehemently 
opposed to using the university as an instru­
ment of social change. The purpose of the 
university, he holds, is critical inquiry- not 
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social change. 
According to Hook, "cultural leftists" 
hold that all teaching is indoctrination -
there is no objective truth - and good 
teaching is simply indoctrination for a 
classless society. There are, of course, some 
leftists who hold this view, but I would he 
surprised if they were more than a very small 
minority. In any case, even teachers -on 
the right and left-who believe in objective 
truth can be guilty of teaching by indoctrina­
tion. 
Indoctrination in the pejorative sense 
relevant here is the influencing of people's 
beliefs by non-rational means (such as giv­
ing a threatening look when the wrong view 
is expressed) or by intellecmally dishonest 
means (such as not raising important ob­
jections to one's favored view, or failing to 
even discuss alternative views). Hook is 
certainly right that indoctrination in the 
classroom in this sense is wrong. 
We can agree further with Hook (and 
the American Association of University 
Professors) that the faculty and administra­
tion have an obligation to ensure that the 
classroom isn't used as a forum for indoc­
trination. Teachers who insist on indoctri­
nating shouldn't be allowed to teach. 
But it's not clear, as Hook seems to 
think it is, that professors of literature, for 
example, are indoctrinating if they bring up 
issues of racism, sexism, classism or impe­
rialism in discussing their texts. For if done 
properly, there will be little non-rational or 
intellectually dishonest influence. And such 
issues can certainly shed light on a work. Of 
course, there are limits. If in a general course 
on Latin American literature a professor 
spent a whole semester on racism and never 
discussed a single piece of Latin American 
literature that would be intellectually irre­
sponsible. But the mere fact that political 
issues (such as racism, etc.) are systematically 
raised in courses (such as literature courses) 
that historically haven't included such dis­
cussions doesn't establish that indoctrination 
is taking place. Whether teaching is indoc­
trination depends on how it is done. 
The last issue I will consider is the 
Western culture curricular requirement many 
universities have. This requirementtypically 
requires students to take specific courses 
that focus on the great texts of the Western 
tradition (of Plato, Shakespeare, etc.). In 
recent years there has been agitation on 
many campuses (such as Stanford's) by some 
students and faculty to replace this require­
ment with one that reqnires courses on both 
Western and non-Western culture, often with 
emphasis on issues of racism, sexism and 
imperialism. Hook was strongly opposed to 
any such change. For he held that this was 
but one more example of "cultural leftists" 
using the university as an instrument of 
social change by imposing their political 
agenda on all students. 
There are a number of intertwined 
issues here. The frrst is: Should there be any 
general educationrequirements atall? Hook 
rightly held there are certain broad catego­
riesof inquiry to which all iberal arts students 
should have some exposure. Whether this is 
best achieved by imposing general education 
requirements (as opposed to simply ensur­
ing that most courses promote this goal) is 
more controversial. But let's assume there 
should be some general education require­
ments. 
ff restrictions (on freedom of 
expression) are appropriate, they 
must be based on the manner or 
context in which views are ex­
pressed - not the content of the 
views. 
A second issue is: Should there be a 
Western cultural general education require­
ment? Again Hook rightly held the affir­
mative view. One of the broad areas of 
which liberal arts students should have some 
knowledge is the important texts and ideas 
oftheir country'sheritage. AndHookrightly 
denied that Western culture requirements 
imply the superiority of Western values, or 
ofthestatusquo. Within the Western tradition 
there are subtraditions with radically different 
values and beliefs. Many of these subtradi­
tions-such as Marxism-are very critical 
of the status quo in the West There is much 
dissent within the Western tradition, and 
teachers of Western culture courses can, and 
perhaps should, bring these out. Furthermore, 
although many of our great texts do contain 
elements (sometimes significant elements) 
of racism, sexism, etc. (and this is just as true 
of other cultures as well), examining such 
texts doesn't imply that such views are 
correct. On the contrary, an examination of 
such texts can, and should, include the 
identification and discussion of such views. 
So merely having a Western culture re­
quirement-even in the absence of a non­
Western culture requirement - doesn't 
imply the superiority of the Western tradition, 
nor does it endorse the racism, sexism, etc. 
of many of the texts. It only implies that 
knowledge of the Western culture is espe­
cially important for Western students. 
A third issue is: Should there be a 
world,or non-Western,culturerequirement? 
Hook rightly held that (a) it was desirable 
that students acquire knowledge of other 
cultures, and (b) that this was less important 
than acquiring knowledge of their own cul­
tural heritage. We should note immediately, 
however, that for American students-more 
that 20 percent of whom have Asian, African 
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or Latin American heritages -knowledge 
of American cultural heritage requires 
knowledge of non-Western cultures. So the 
apparent conflict between non-Western 
culture and the students' cultural heritage is 
largely illusory in the American context 
The very same rationale that supports a 
Western culture requirement (the impor­
tance of knowledge of one's heritage) also 
supports -but to a lesser extent-a non­
Western culture reqnirement. For that rea­
son, it's not clear to me that a non-Western 
culture requirement is inappropriate. 
A fourth issue is: For required courses 
in Western culture (or the Western-culture 
component of required world culture courses) 
is it appropriate to replace some of the classic 
texts with less significant works of the 
Western tradition by women or people of 
color? Presumably, Hook allowed that some 
less known texts may in fact be more sig­
nificant And so presumably he was open to 
the possibility we might discover that past 
works of women or people of color are more 
significant than we have taken them to be. 
But he was clearly opposed to adding texts 
simp! y because they are by women or people 
of color. Students should, he claimed, study 
the great works of our civilization, and the 
race or sex of the authors is irrelevant 
Of course, what factors determine the 
significance of a work is very controversial. 
Historical influence? Artistic merit in some 
abstract sense? Usefulness in helping us 
understand our present and past culture? 
Hook seemed to hold, and I agree, that all 
three of these factors (and probably others) 
are relevant for decisions about what texts 
are studied. But if that is so, and Hook didn't 
seem to recognize this, then there may well 
be good grounds for including texts of women 
and people of color -even when they are 
historically less influential and have less 
artistic merit. For sometimes hearing a voice 
that hasn't been historically influential can 
be very effective in helping us understand 
our past and present culture. For example, if 
along with historically influential works of a 
given period, one also reads works of women 
and minorities, one could examine how they 
differed in outlook and why that was so. 
So historical influence and artistic 
merit aren't everything, and it may well be 
appropriate to replace some more influential 
works with less influential works. And this 
is because the goal of a Western culture 
requirement isn't merely knowledge of the 
great works of the past, but also knowledge 
of our past and present traditions in all their 
forms. 
As should be apparent, I am critical of 
a number of Hook's views. But on one point 
at least, I am in admiration. There are 
growing social pressures on American 
campuses to take the concerns and per­
spectives of women and people of color 
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much more seriously than has been done in 
the past On the whole I think this is good, 
but often these pressures reach the point of 
dogmatism and intolerance. It is important 
that those opposing the prevailing tendency 
not be buUied imo silence. We constantly 
must be challenged to defend our views and 
practices - no matter how clearly correct 
they seem. For that reason Sidney Hook has 
performed a great service by publicly chal­
lenging what he sees as unhealthy tenden­
cies. 
PeterValkntyneischairoftheDepartment 
of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Vir­
ginia Commonwealth University. 
This book offers an excellent view 
into the world of structural and semiotic 
literary analysis. In this regard, the subtitle 
of the book is misleading. This slim volume 
doesn't present a single structural-semiotic 
reading of Genesis, but rather a collection of 
different typesof methodologically informed 
readings of the same text. The results of the 
author's different probes are both strikingly 
diverse and yet roughly compatible with 
each other. This is why, I assume, the author 
has chosen the foretitle: an "elusive" cove­
nant. It is the author's contention that there 
are in the end numerous ways of eliciting 
meaning from Genesis. He sets out to show 
us what some of these are if one adopts the 
hermeneutical stance associated with con­
temporary literary criticism. The outcome is 
a fascinating rereading of what we thought 
were the well-known stories of the text 
Prewitt adduces a side of these Biblical texts 
that is quite different from what the received 
hermeneutical traditions have provided. 
The book offersfour differentreadings 
of Genesis, each of which exploits, and so 
illuminates, a particular structural or semi­
otic characteristic of the text at hand. The 
first foray, focussing on genealogies, adduces 
the social patterns of Genesis and thereby 
also the social defmition of"lsrael." Draw­
ing heavily on the work of Edmund Leach, 
Prewitt comes to conclusions that are in 
striking alignment with anthropological and 
archaeological conclusions of recent years 
about the social dimension making Israel a 
distinct people in the pre-Monarchic period 
(for example, in the writings of Frank Frick, 
Niels Lemcheand Israel Finkelstein, to name 
a few). These theories see Israel not as a 
preformed and preexistent lineage group 
that imposed itself on the region, but rather 
as a group that only gradually achieved a 
consciousness of self-defmition. Prewitt's 
readings show that Genesis too can yield this 
result. 
The second chapter looks at what the 
author terms "mythscapes." The goal here is 
to place the tribes and peoples of Genesis 
into geographic and thereby geometric re­
lationships. This chapter, as the previous 
one, describes the problems of Israelite ter­
ritoriality, kingship and peoplehood in a 
way that is unprecedented among the received 
literary inteipretations of the text but which 
do confirm anthropological and social re­
constructions of the formation of early Israel. 
Chapter three is entitled "Structural 
Hermeneutics" and is devoted to charting 
out the rhetorical structure of the book as a 
whole. To pull off this kind of large-scale 
analysis, one must assume the authorship of 
Genesis has tightly controlled such elements 
as genealogy, territory and social organiza­
tion. Taking this assumption for granted, 
Prewitt argues in this chapter that the author 
of Genesis has used these elements so as to 
solve the social contradictions inherem in 
Israelite life, especially those associated with 
lines of lineage and succession. 
The fourth chapter, "Mythos and 
Ethos," works out of the assumption that the 
diverse individual substories making up 
Genesis are in effect microcosms of the 
whole. Thus the tale surrounding the rela­
tionship of Judah ofTamar and its aftermath, 
for example, are taken to be structurally 
congruent with the social and genealogical 
patterns worked out in the macrocosm de­
fmed in Genesis. The Judah-Tamar story 
simply works out the implications ofGenesis' 
overall universe as it applies to one partic­
ular case. Taken together, the various mar­
riage and alliance themes in Genesis are 
treated, then, as structural variations of each 
other that in sum represent a systematic 
application of the same values over different 
examples. The inspiration of this chapter 
clearly comes from the workofCiaudeLevi­
Strauss. 
What makes this collection of exam­
ples so compelling is the great care and 
detail that has gone into crafting each of 
them. In many ways the book can be read as 
a kind of textbook on how one might carry 
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through various kinds of structural analyses. 
Prewitt carefully lays out the theoretical 
background that informs each probe, leads 
the reader through his analysis step by step 
and provides charts and graphs on the way as 
needed. It is because of the great care and 
internal consistency of each individual 
chapter that the overall coherence of the four 
taken together is so remarkable. The indi­
vidual conclusions, each reached on its own, 
dovetail beautifully to create a more or less 
single picture of the internal structure of 
Israelite society as adduced through a vari­
ety of literary perspectives. 
The other side of this clarity is that it 
places in stark relief before the reader the 
foundational assumptions on which the study 
rests. There seems to me to be two areas of 
concern in particular which the present study 
raises. While Prewitt himself is aware of 
these questions, his handling of them is far 
from adequate, and they therefore bring the 
entire enteiprise into methodological ques­
tion. The ftrSt has to do with the nature of the 
text itself, in this case the book of Genesis. Is 
it really the unified piece of work which 
much of the analysis requires? The second 
has to do with the epistemological status of 
the results that Prewitt produces. Each of 
these questions is important enough to 
warrant some discussion. 
Let me begin with the question about 
the nature of the book. It is commonplace 
among critical scholars that Genesis is not a 
single coherent work put together by one 
author. It is seen rather as an "artificial" 
·composition built out of at least three prior 
"documents": J, E and P. These prior 
documents themselves derive from different 
centuries (9th, 8th and 6th, respectively) and 
from various contexts (Judah, Israel, post­
Exilic Judea, respectively). The question 
then is how legitimate is it to take a composite 
work of this kind and adduce from it a single 
convictional pattern for "Israel"? 
One way of dealing with this, of course, 
is to deny the Documentary Hypothesis al­
together. This option is certainly open to 
Prewitt, but he does not choose to exercise it 
In fact, at several points, he acknowledges 
the existence and acceptability of the Doc­
umentary Hypothesis. His claim is, that 
despitethe diversesourcesand lateredaction 
of the received text, Genesis as we have it is 
still a unitary entity. 
Another possibility at this point is to 
adopt a Levi-Straussian approach and argue 
that the time and venue of each individual 
component story is immaterial since together 
they are all variations of a single underlying 
mythic universe. This assertion, I believe, 
will not serve here. Prewitt is not, after all, 
trying to derive general human mythic truths 
from the stories of Genesis. He is out to 
show, rather, that certain quite specific so­
cial assumptions govern the character of 
Menorah Review, Spring 1991 
Genesis' world. The content of these social 
assumptions is described in such detail that 
one wonders if Levi-Strauss' thesis that all 
myths are variations on a theme is really 
applicable. We are dealing after all at this 
level with specifics of social relationships, 
not with mythic structures. It seems rather 
unlikely that precisely the same notions of 
marriage, succession and tribal lineage could 
be operative in pre-Monarchic Israel, the 
time of Solomon, the Kingdom ofJ udah and 
the post-Exilic community of Judea. From 
most other evidence, we find these to be 
rather distinct societies. It is arguably legit­
imate to assume that different alliance sto­
ries from, say, the period of the Kingdom are 
all variations of a particular culture-wide 
understanding; it is considerably harder to 
justify the assertion that stories from the 
Kingdom are systematically congruent in 
detail with assumptions common in the pre­
Monarchic period on the one hand and the 
Persian period on the other, even should it 
turnoutthatthesediverse communitiesshare 
in a common "Israelite" myth. 
The composite character of Genesis is 
especially a problem, it seems to me, when 
Prewitt is doing his large-scale, macrocos­
mic analysis. He seem to have discovered 
literary structures that systematically un­
dergird parts of Genesis and can be traced in 
a vast and complete grid throughout the 
book. While his argument on one level is 
compelling, one wonders how this is possi­
ble if the book is in fact a composite as he 
accepts it to be elsewhere. I kept wondering 
whether we were seeing not the existence of 
actual structural elements, but the conclu­
sions of a clever literary critic. 
This leads me to my second area of 
concern: the epistemological status of what 
Prewitt has adduced. A few examples may 
help clarify the problem. In Chapter Two, 
Prewitt determines that the textual structure 
suggests that the tribe of Levi, as a tribe of 
religious functionaries, was actually created 
"artificially" out of existin_g social structures 
in order to provide a sort of cement for 
holding the newly formed Davidic social 
organization together. It was, then, created 
from the top down. Now in this same chapter 
Prewitt discusses Norman Gottwald's study, 
recognizing that his understanding of the 
emergence of Israel requires a "bouom up" 
formation of the Levites. He concludes that 
chapter by saying that since we cannot 
decide whether the structure of Genesis de­
scribes a real social situation or an idealization 
of what should be the case, we can never 
determine which process most accurately 
describes the historical case. I wonder if we 
rea II y are ever in a position to claim that such 
literary analysis gives us data as to the "his­
torical case" as opposed to how the author­
ship supposed or wanted things to be. That 
is, I have a hard time putting the results of 
literary analysis on the same level of histor­
ical reliability as archeological evidence, for 
example. 
Note, for example, the structure of 
wife-taking in the Abraham narrative. Pre­
witt concludes after a series of analyses of 
various characters that before the Covenant 
of Circumcision, men could take wives from 
other groups but after the covenant they 
could not give their sisters as wives to those 
outside the circumcision alliance. This may, 
in fact, describe precisely what happens in 
the story, but is this an accurate and reliable 
picture of Israel's social history? Prewitt 
seems to say yes. He is willing to concede 
readily that the narrative itself might not be 
history properly speaking, but the social 
relationships structured by the text are, he is 
willing to aver, accurate reflections of Isra­
el's actual social history. Prewitt claims to 
observe features in this late text that char­
acterize the emergent social structure of 
"Israel" in the time of David. 
At the end of Chapter Four, Prewitt in 
fact reflects on the epistemological status of 
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his inquiry. He is arguing in particular 
against people who read the Bible in an 
uncritical, literal sort of way and then use the 
results of their reading to make moral 
judgments about others. Prewitt does not 
want to engage in such simplistic moralizing. 
He is willing to concede that his conclusions 
are interpretations allowed, but not de­
manded, by the text. Interpretation, he says, 
"is not simply a matter of structure, but is 
instead that activity wherein we allow our 
minds to move beyond structure to impli­
cation, and from implication to a total ex­
perience."(p.l26) We mustwonder then at 
the end of this marvelous exposition of 
structural methodologies if we after all have 
been studying Biblical Israel, the book of 
Genesis, or Terry Prewitt In any case, the 
experience was exhilarating. 
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